DePuy, commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), identified three major lessons learned: 4 This comparison will help identify similarities and differences, separate what is new from what is not, and validate the lessons learned.Īfter the Yom Kippur War, U.S. This article will compare events in the Russo-Ukrainian War to several large-scale conflicts of the past in which at least one of the sides was a Western force all are part of what has been dubbed second- or third-generation warfare, in which mass firepower or armored maneuver ruled the battlefield. This can be shown by using a framework derived from the lessons of another paradigm-changing conflict: the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Yet, while the war is unique, it is not unique in being unique, and its lessons are neither totally new nor a mere continuation of the past. It is a high-technology war, with armed drones, satellite phones, and images showing Ukrainian antitank missiles hitting Russian equipment. The current war in Ukraine, then, without large tank battles but definitely with industrial intent and prosecution, is either an outlier-a “blast from the past”-or a different kind of war altogether. This does not mean a big fight with large groups of forces and weapons is no longer possible, but it does mean that it will not be an industrial one in either intent or prosecution industrial war no longer exists.” 2 Many military leaders and strategists shared this view for a long time, and with good reasons. Nonetheless, war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.” 1 Smith argued that this was because the character of war had changed, explaining that “the wars in which armoured formations could and should be used are no longer practical. Confrontation, conflict and combat undoubtedly exist all around the world. As retired British Army general Sir Rupert Smith, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, declared in his 2007 classic, The Utility of Force, “War no longer exists. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shocked the Western world, for it was a kind of conflict thought to be long gone.
Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, war, drone, innovation, tank, maneuver For all the technology being introduced, not only do tactics remain important, but the war itself is closer in many aspects to the “classic” wars of the twentieth century than to any futuristic concept of warfare. While there are many lessons to be learned from this war, it is not as much a break with the past as it is a continuation of it. However, a closer look shows a more nuanced picture. The war, which has sent seismic shocks throughout the world, was conceived by many to be a new kind of conflict, with innovative, high-technology weapons and equipment bringing a sea change to the history of warfare. Abstract: This article deals with the tactical lessons of the first six months of the Russian war in Ukraine.
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